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Abstract: Using a rich database of non-prime mortgages from New York City, we find that census 
tract level neighborhood characteristics are important predictors of default behavior, even after 
controlling for an extensive set of controls for loan and borrower characteristics.  First, default rates 
increase with the rate of foreclosure notices and the number of lender-owned properties (REOs) in 
the tract.  Second, default rates on home purchase mortgages are higher in census tracts with larger 
shares of black residents, regardless of the borrower’s own race.  We explore possible explanations 
for this second finding and conclude that it likely reflects differential treatment of black 
neighborhoods by the mortgage industry in ways that are unobserved in our data.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
 The wave of delinquencies and foreclosures that began in 2007 and the financial crisis that it 
engendered have drawn new attention to the different reasons why households may end up in 
foreclosure.  In this paper, we use a newly assembled dataset from New York City to examine the 
role of borrower, loan and neighborhood characteristics on default rates of non-prime mortgages.  
The depth of the dataset allows us to provide a more complete set of controls than previous 
research.  In particular we are able to examine the effects of census tract level neighborhood 
characteristics while controlling for detailed individual borrower and loan characteristics.  The 
analysis of neighborhood effects is critical as policymakers consider whether and how public policies 
to address the foreclosure crisis and to regulate lending practices should be tailored to the needs and 
experiences of different types of neighborhoods. 
 Many researchers have used LoanPerformance from FirstAmerican CoreLogic, a commercial 
database that is the major source of non-prime mortgage performance information for the mortgage 
industry.  A major limitation of this database is that its most detailed geographic identifier is the zip 
code of the mortgaged property.  A zip code is a good deal bigger than what is generally thought of 
as a “neighborhood.”  Researchers studying neighborhoods typically examine census tracts: in New 
York City there are about 2,200 census tracts, compared to 180 zip codes, and on average, a tract is 
13 city blocks, while a zip code is 160 city blocks.   
 We have matched LoanPerformance records to actual parcels of land with a high level of 
precision using deeds from New York City’s Department of Finance.  This allows us to merge 
information about borrowers, their payment histories, and the terms of their loans, with information 
about a borrower’s race and ethnicity from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) records, as 
well as census tract level neighborhood characteristics from a variety of sources.   In particular, we 
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have precise information at the census tract level on the number of foreclosures and the share of 
properties that fail to sell for the lender’s reservation price and thus become “real estate owned” 
(REO).  While repeat sales house price indices are not available at the census tract level due to 
insufficient sales transactions, we use indices for 56 different community districts (political 
jurisdictions within New York City that average just over four square miles each).  We are not aware 
of any other mortgage research that has examined such detailed information at so fine a level of 
geography, and that contains a full set of critical loan and borrower characteristics, especially the 
borrower’s credit score and race.  
 We report results on the effect of loan and borrower risk characteristics on mortgage default.  
Not only do these estimates broadly confirm earlier results from the literature while using the 
additional controls provided by our much richer dataset, but the magnitude of these estimates do 
not change when we add the additional controls.  This is an important finding that confirms the 
validity of existing research on the effect of loan and borrower risk characteristics on non-prime 
mortgage defaults that does not have the wealth of local level information that we are able to use 
here.   
 The primary contribution of the paper, however, is our finding that neighborhood 
characteristics have a powerful impact on the likelihood of default, even after an extensive set of 
controls.  Moreover, when we add a set of analogous zip code level characteristics, they are generally 
insignificant and do not eliminate the significance of the census tract level variables, showing that 
the finer geographic variation that we use adds substantial explanatory information.   
Two important neighborhood effects emerge.  First, we find that mortgages in census tracts 
with high foreclosure and REO activity have a substantially higher chance of defaulting.  In the body 
of the paper, we argue that this likely reflects a local contagion effect whereby more information 
about the default process, or reduced stigma surrounding it, leads to more defaults.  In addition, the 
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foreclosure and REO rates may serve as a proxy for very local housing market conditions that are 
not captured in our community district level house price indices.   
Second, we find that home purchase mortgages in neighborhoods with large shares of black 
residents have a substantially higher chance of defaulting, regardless of the borrower’s own race.  We 
explore possible explanations for this finding and conclude that it likely reflects unobserved loan and 
borrower characteristics that are both correlated with higher default risk and are more prevalent in 
black neighborhoods.  Moreover, we argue that the most plausible candidate for these unobservables 
is the differential treatment of black neighborhoods by the mortgage industry via marketing, 
underwriting or loan terms.   
 
 
2.  Background 
 
 There is an extensive and growing body of empirical literature on the determinants of 
mortgage default.1  Rather than exhaustively review that literature, our goal in this section is to 
provide context for our analysis of the role that borrower, loan and neighborhood characteristics 
play in the default of non-prime mortgages.   
 Non-prime mortgages have traditionally extended credit to borrowers who could not qualify 
for prime mortgages, and so by their very nature tend to have higher default risk than do prime 
mortgages.  Okah and Orr (2010) compare non-prime and prime mortgages in New York City and 
find that on average, non-prime borrowers have, at origination, much lower credit scores, higher 
debt-to-income ratios (DTIs) and loan-to-value ratios (LTVs), as well as substantially higher rates of 
default.  Data from other locations show similar patterns, and several studies find that non-prime 
                                                 
1 See Mayer et al. (2009) for a recent review. 
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status is one of the strongest predictors of default and foreclosure (Coulton et al., 2008; Ding et al., 
2008; Gerardi et al., 2007).   
 
2.1.  The Relationship Between Loan and Borrower Characteristics and Default Risk 
 The research on both prime and non-prime mortgages has stressed the importance of credit 
scores, DTIs and LTVs on default behavior.  Studies that have information on borrower credit 
scores find that they play a large role in predicting default (e.g., Amronim and Paulson, 2010; 
Haughwout et al., 2008).  Several studies have found that higher initial DTIs contribute to a higher 
probability of default, although the effects seem to be less strong than that of LTV, and are 
somewhat inconsistent over time (e.g., Ding et al., 2008; Foote et al., 2009).  Recent research on 
non-prime mortgages has emphasized that it is the current, and not the initial LTV that increases the 
probability of delinquency and default (e.g., Demyanyk, 2009).  Foreclosures happen less frequently 
in appreciating markets, most likely because financially-distressed borrowers can more easily sell 
their properties or refinance and prepay the remaining balance on their loans (e.g., Danis and 
Pennington-Cross, 2005; Schloemer et al., 2006).   
 Few models of mortgage default using loan-level data are able to identify and control for 
borrower race as well as credit history and loan characteristics.  In studies that do, there is some 
evidence that non-white borrowers are more likely to default than white borrowers.  For example, 
Firestone et al. (2007), using data on conforming fixed rate mortgages, find that black and Hispanic 
borrowers have higher default rates.  Jiang et al. (2009), using data from a national mortgage bank, 
find that delinquency rates are higher for black and Hispanic borrowers, and that the difference is 
even greater among broker-originated loans.  
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2.2.  The Relationship Between Neighborhood Characteristics and Default Risk  
 Considerable research documents the negative externalities neighborhoods experience from 
foreclosures, particularly in terms of the values of nearby housing (e.g., Campbell et al., 2009; Rogers 
and Winter, 2009; Schuetz et al., 2008).  The literature also shows that nearby foreclosures can lead 
to a heightened probability of default or foreclosure, for a number of reasons (see Campbell et al., 
2009; Harding et al., 2009; Hartley, 2010; Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Ioannides, 2003; Lee, 2008; 
Leonard and Murdoch, 2009; Lin et al., 2009).  Negative physical externalities caused by 
foreclosures, including visible deterioration, maintenance deferral or vandalism, may cause declines 
in neighboring home values causing potential homebuyers to view the neighborhood as less 
attractive.  Foreclosure-induced mobility may increase the number of homes on the market, and 
thereby drive prices down.  Further, the sale of foreclosed properties at discounted prices may lower 
property appraisals and sellers’ reservation prices for nearby properties.   
 Research on whether neighborhood racial composition influences default is rather thin.  
While the limited number of studies using data on individual loans sometimes find a significant 
relationship between the share of minority residents or homeowners in a census tract and default or 
foreclosure rates, they are not able to rule out the possibility that minority share is merely a proxy 
for credit history (e.g., Berkovec et al., 1994; Van Order and Zorn, 2000).     
 Several recent studies document a relationship between default rates and the share of 
subprime loans in a zip code.  Mian and Sufi (2009) find a positive relationship using national zip 
code level data.  By contrast, using a set of non-prime individual mortgages from Phoenix, Agarwal 
et al. (2011) find that the zip code share of subprime mortgages reduces borrower defaults, which they 
argue is due to a positive relationship between subprime activity and house price appreciation in 
Phoenix.  They also find that the zip code level concentration of riskier mortgages (hybrid ARMs 
and no- or low-documentation loans) increases the probability of borrower default.   
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3.  Data Description 
 
 To investigate the determinants of default, we begin with all first lien hybrid 2/28 and 3/27 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)2 and 30-year fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) originated in New York 
City from 2004 to 2007 in LoanPerformance, a database that covers over 90 percent of all non-
prime securitized mortgages in the United States over this time period.3  We observe monthly 
updates on these loans until December 2009.  Although LoanPerformance provides detailed 
information on borrower characteristics, loan terms, and payment history, it contains no information 
on borrower race and provides little in terms of neighborhood characteristics.  We therefore 
matched the LoanPerformance database to New York City mortgage deeds.  This told us about 
additional liens on the mortgaged property and its exact location, which in turn allowed us to merge 
on a variety of additional variables at the census tract level.  We also merged on Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) data which gave us additional borrower information including race and 
ethnicity.  Details of these merges and the additional data sources are provided in the Data 
Appendix. 
 In the analysis below, we use the 78 percent of LoanPerformance hybrid ARMs and FRMs 
that matched both the deeds records and a unique loan in the HMDA database.  This sample is not 
significantly different from the full universe in terms of the loan, borrower, and neighborhood 
characteristics that we use in the analyses below.  Figure 1 plots the number of originations by 
quarter.   
 
  
                                                 
2 2/28s are 30-year loans with an initial rate that remains in effect for the first 2 years, and then is reset every six months 
for the remaining 28 years, while on a 3/27, the initial rate is in effect for 3 years and floats for 27 years. 
3 These hybrid ARMs and FRMs represent almost two-thirds of all first lien LoanPerformance mortgages in New York 
City.  Because LoanPerformance includes only securitized loans, any inferences should be limited to such loans. 
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3.1.  Loan and Borrower Characteristics 
 Table 1 displays summary statistics for loan and borrower characteristics.  Our sample is split 
roughly equally between FRMs and hybrid ARMs.  In terms of borrower characteristics, ARM 
borrowers tend to have lower FICO scores4, higher debt-to-income ratios (DTIs) and higher 
combined loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) at origination than FRM borrowers.  The combined LTV 
measure is reported in LoanPerformance and includes any other liens in existence at the time of 
origination.  Any new liens taken out afterwards will not be reflected in this measure; however, we 
have information on these liens from the mortgage deeds: 5 percent of ARM borrowers and 11 
percent of FRM borrowers took on additional debt against the same property (in any form, 
including second mortgages, home equity loans and lines of credit) that totaled at least 5 percent of 
the first lien’s original loan amount.  Only about 40 percent of borrowers provided full loan 
documentation.   
 We rely on HMDA for some additional borrower characteristics: a majority of primary 
borrowers in our sample are male, and 21 percent of ARMs and 28 percent of the FRMs included a 
coborrower.  Almost half of ARM borrowers and over one third of FRM borrowers are black.5  By 
contrast, blacks made up just 20 percent of borrowers who originated a loan in New York City 
during 2004-2007, according to HMDA.   
 
3.2.  Neighborhood Characteristics 
 Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the distribution of foreclosures across New York City in 
2009.  Each dot represents one notice of foreclosure for a 1-4 family building.  The map shows that 
foreclosures are concentrated, especially in neighborhoods where the majority of residents are black, 
                                                 
4 The Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) credit score is the most widely used credit score model in the U.S. and takes into 
account payment history, credit utilization, length of credit history, types of credit and recent searches for credit. 
5 We use these non-missing, mutually exclusive race/ethnicity categories: “white” (white non-Hispanic), “black” (black 
non-Hispanic), “Hispanic” (Hispanic white), “Asian” (Asian non-Hispanic), and “other” (all others).     
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according to the 2000 Census.6  To investigate the link between neighborhood racial composition 
and foreclosures, we constructed a neighborhood foreclosure rate measure defined as the number of 
foreclosure notices (lis pendens) issued on 1-4 family buildings in a census tract during a six-month 
period, divided by the stock of 1-4 family buildings in that tract.  Figure 3 shows average 
neighborhood foreclosure rates on a semiannual basis, broken down by neighborhood racial 
composition.  Overall, neighborhood foreclosure rates in New York City have trended upwards 
since 2004.  In tracts where more than 60 percent of residents are black, the average foreclosure rate 
in the first half of 2004 was 0.4 percent, almost double the rate in tracts that are less than 40 percent 
black.  By the last half of 2009, foreclosure rates in black neighborhoods had doubled to about 0.8 
percent, compared to 0.4 percent for non-black neighborhoods.   
 Table 2 summarizes the distribution of loans in our sample across neighborhoods in terms 
of demographics in 2000.  A considerable number of loans in our sample are in tracts that were at 
least 60 percent black in 2000: almost half of ARMs and 41 percent of FRMs.  This may be 
surprising considering that blacks made up just one quarter of New York City residents; but it likely 
reflects both the higher proportion of blacks in our non-prime sample (as noted earlier), and the fact 
that there are relatively high levels of residential racial segregation in New York City, so that black 
borrowers are more likely than non-black borrowers to live in neighborhoods that have a high 
concentration of black residents.  In tracts that are predominantly non-black, FRMs are more 
prevalent than ARMs, while in predominantly black tracts, the majority of loans are ARMs.   
  Table 2 also considers the neighborhood share of non-prime loans at origination, calculated 
as the fraction of non-prime loans originated in LoanPerformance divided by total loans originated 
in HMDA, during the 2 years preceding the loan’s origination month.  The vast majority of loans in 
                                                 
6 Throughout the paper, we classify neighborhoods based on the distribution of residents by race/ethnicity as follows: 
“black” residents include non-Hispanic blacks, “white” residents include non-Hispanic whites, “Asian” residents include 
non-Hispanic Asians, and “Hispanic” residents include all individuals reporting Hispanic origin regardless of race.   
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our sample are in tracts where fewer than 30 percent of mortgages were non-prime in the 2 years 
preceding origination.   
 The final two indicators in table 2 are measured across all loan-months in our sample.  While 
the majority of loan-month observations are in census tracts that experienced a foreclosure rate of 
less than one percent in the six months prior, about one in five loan-months are in neighborhoods 
where the foreclosure rate was 2 percent or more.  The dynamic neighborhood REO rate is 
calculated as the number of properties listed as being in REO at any point in time during the six 
months preceding the month of analysis, divided by the total number of 1-4 family buildings in the 
census tract.  While the REO rate measures the stock of properties that were in REO at any point 
during the preceding six months, the foreclosure rate measures the flow of new properties into 
foreclosure during the preceding six months.  About two-thirds of loan-months were in census 
tracts where the REO rate was less than 1 percent, while 14 percent of loan-months experienced 
neighborhood REO rates above 3 percent.7   
 
3.3.  Default Rates 
 We examine the hazard of default for each month since origination, with default defined as 
90 days of delinquency.  This definition is used in much of the literature on mortgage default risk as 
it is entirely in the borrower’s control and excludes the behavior of the lender or servicer.  The 
hazard is simply the probability that a loan enters default, conditional on not having defaulted 
earlier.  Figure 4 shows hazard rates up to December 2009, by the year the loan was originated.  Two 
clear patterns emerge.  First, ARMs tend to experience much higher default rates on average than 
FRMs that were originated in the same year.  For example, among 2004 originations, the default 
                                                 
7 The higher stock of REOs compared with the flow of foreclosures reflects a large fraction of REO properties 
remaining in REO for long periods of time.  For example, of properties that entered REO in 2007, fewer than half had 
exited within 12 months (Furman Center 2010).  
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hazard in month 18 after origination was 0.4 percent for FRMs, compared to 1.0 percent for ARMs.  
Second, for both loan types, later originations are more likely to experience default.  The underlying 
risk characteristics of loans may have been changing over time.  In addition, adverse changes in the 
macroeconomic environment - in particular, rising unemployment and weak house price 
appreciation - may have contributed to the striking increase in default risk for loans originated in 
more recent years.     
 Figure 5 plots default hazards by borrower race for census tracts that are predominantly 
non-black (less than 40 percent black) and neighborhoods that are predominantly black (more than 
60 percent black).  These displayed hazards do not control for any variables.  In the non-black 
neighborhoods, black borrowers experience default rates that are higher than non-black borrowers, 
both for ARMs and FRMs.  However, in black neighborhoods, black and non-black borrowers 
display similar default hazards.   
 
 
4.  Empirical Specification and Results 
 
4.1.  Empirical Specification 
 To examine the role of borrower, loan and neighborhood characteristics on default, we 
follow much of the literature on mortgage terminations and estimate semi-parametric Cox 
proportional hazard models of the form: 
 hi(t) = h0(t) exp ( β loan characteristicsi  + γ neighborhood characteristicsi  
  + δ borrower characteristicsi + α calendar time and origination year fixed effects)  
where hi(t) is the default hazard of mortgage i at time t, that is, the probability that mortgage i will 
experience a default at time t, conditional on not having previously defaulted.  The proportional 
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hazard model assumes that there is an underlying baseline hazard function h0(t) that is shared by all 
mortgages in the analysis sample.  The model then allows time-varying explanatory variables to shift 
this baseline up or down proportionally, with α, β, γ and δ representing vectors of coefficient 
estimates.  The Cox model provides no direct estimate of, and makes no assumptions about, the 
functional form of the baseline hazard, and is able to account for both right and left censoring of the 
longitudinal data.  In our data, mortgage prepayments are treated as right-censored observations and 
there is also minor left-censoring as a few months typically elapse between the time of origination 
and the entry of the mortgage into the LoanPerformance database upon securitization.   
 The calendar time fixed effects in our models are in terms of quarter dummies.  These will 
control for any city-, state- or nation- wide macroeconomic factors, including unemployment rates 
and city-wide house price movements.  The origination year fixed effects are intended to pick up any 
city-wide systematic changes in mortgage characteristics over time, including changes in average 
borrower risk and underwriting standards.   
 By estimating separate hazard models for hybrid ARMs and FRMs, we remove any 
endogeneity effects due to borrowers selecting into different product types.8  Our results are 
displayed in tables 3, 4 and 5.  We report hazard ratios (the exponential of the estimated coefficients) 
that can be interpreted as the proportional shift in the baseline hazard as a result of a unit change in 
the variable of interest.  Hazard ratios greater than one indicate a positive effect, while those less 
than one indicate a negative effect.  Our robust standard errors are clustered at the census tract level 
to account for any neighborhood level spatial correlation of residuals.   
 
  
                                                 
8 In the hybrid ARM models discussed below, we also included an indicator variable for 3/27 ARMs.  The coefficient on 
this variable implies that 3/27s have a default hazard that is approximately 18 percent lower than the 2/28s.  When we 
limit the sample to only 2/28s (almost 3 in 4 of the hybrids), all the patterns that we describe below remain. 
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4.2.  Adjustable Rate Mortgage Results 
 Loan and property characteristics.  The first rows in table 3 show the hazard ratios 
associated with loan pricing terms.  All of these terms are strongly significant and in the expected 
direction, with the default hazard monotonically increasing with higher relative interest rates at 
origination and with higher margins.  These loan pricing terms may reflect both the direct effect of 
higher mortgage payments on the likelihood of default and ex ante risk pricing by lenders, to the 
extent that our controls for borrower risk characteristics (discussed below) do not fully capture the 
lender’s overall assessment of borrower risk.  The next set of variables in table 3 measure the size of 
the payment shock upon initial adjustment of the interest rate.  The direction and time path 
described by these coefficients are also as expected, with larger payment shocks associated with 
more defaults.   
 Consistent with virtually all prior research, lower credit scores and high DTIs at origination 
significantly increase the default hazard.  The current combined LTV also has significant, large and 
monotonically increasing effects on default.9  We might expect those who take out additional debt 
on the property to be more likely to default because of a higher debt burden.  There is a 
countervailing screening argument, however, that only borrowers who are good risks will be able to 
secure additional financing, so new debt may be negatively associated with default.  We find a 
negative effect for new debt, suggesting that screening might overwhelm the direct impact of having 
to shoulder a greater debt burden, but the effect is statistically insignificant.   
 Having a coborrower on the loan lowers the rate of default, probably because a coborrower 
diversifies the effect of income shocks.  Higher original loan balances, entered in the model as a 
third order polynomial, are positively associated with significantly higher default rates (coefficients 
not displayed).  Home purchase loans have higher default rates than do refinances, possibly 
                                                 
9 To estimate current LTV, we use the monthly dynamic loan balance from LoanPerformance (the numerator) and 
adjust the property value (the denominator) using the appropriate community district level house price index.   
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reflecting the fact that refinancers have longer housing tenure, and also cannot be first time 
mortgage borrowers.  Surprisingly, we find that owner-occupiers have elevated default rates 
compared with investors, though owner-occupancy is self-reported and may be unreliable.  Further 
decomposition of this owner-occupier indicator by documentation level reveals that most of the 
positive effect that owner-occupation has on the default hazard is for no- or low-documentation 
loans.  However, as shown in the table, full documentation loans as a group are not significantly less 
likely to default than loans without full documentation.   
 Non-racial neighborhood characteristics.  In the subsequent models of table 3, we add a 
variety of neighborhood characteristics.  It is noteworthy that current LTV aside, the loan and 
property coefficients are virtually unchanged when these neighborhood characteristics are added.  
This is an important finding that confirms the validity of most existing research on mortgage 
defaults that does not have the wealth of very local neighborhood level information that we are able 
to use here.  The LTV coefficients are smaller in magnitude when we add the neighborhood 
characteristics, as local house price appreciation is likely correlated with these neighborhood 
characteristics.   
  The estimates on the neighborhood characteristics themselves highlight important spatial 
patterns in default.  First, we include several census tract level demographic measures from the 2000 
Census.  As expected, we find that lower median income neighborhoods have higher rates of 
default, and loans against properties in neighborhoods with more high school graduates generally 
have lower rates of default.  Using poverty rates instead of median income in these models gave 
similar results.  Neighborhoods with more non-native born residents are also associated with lower 
rates of default, but differentiating these immigrant neighborhoods by their dominant race or ethnic 
group (black, Hispanic or Asian) did not reveal any clear differences among them.   
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 The next set of rows in table 3 show the effects of neighborhood foreclosure notices and the 
fraction of properties held by lenders (REOs).  We find a positive and generally monotonically 
increasing effect of both.  Because foreclosure and REO rates are positively correlated (an REO 
must have originally generated a foreclosure notice), these two sets of coefficients should be 
considered together.  A foreclosure rate of over 3 percent in the surrounding census tract increases 
the default hazard by over one quarter, compared with mortgages in neighborhoods where the 
foreclosure rate is less than 1 percent.  In addition, REO rates higher than 3 percent increase the 
default hazard by at least 12 percent, compared to neighborhoods with REO rates of less than 1 
percent.   
 We also included the non-prime share of mortgages originated in the census tract during the 
two years prior to the loan’s origination.  In model 2, this is positively associated with default: ARMs 
in tracts where this non-prime share is more than 30 percent have a default hazard that is over 25 
percent higher than loans where the non-prime share was less than 10 percent.  However, in models 
3 and 4, when we add explanatory variables for neighborhood racial composition, the non-prime 
share estimates are reduced in magnitude and no longer significant.  We found a similar pattern for 
analogous variables that measure the share of riskier mortgage types in a census tract (the fraction of 
hybrid ARMs, and no- and low-documentation loans).  The coefficients were generally positive and 
significant when added to model 2, but became much reduced in magnitude and insignificant when 
added to models 3 and 4 (results not displayed). 
 To capture potential differences in the underwriting standards that prevailed at the 
neighborhood level at the time of the loan’s origination, we also ran models that included mortgage 
application denial rates in the census tract in the six months prior to the loan’s origination.10  Higher 
mortgage denial rates at origination may indicate more stringent underwriting standards at the time 
                                                 
10 The HMDA mortgage application denial rate is: the number of denied applications, divided by the sum of loans 
originated, denied applications, and approved applications that were not accepted by the applicant. 
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of a loan’s origination and thus may be associated with lower default rates.  We found that while 
these coefficients were negative, they were small and insignificant once all the other controls were 
included.  To capture the ability of borrowers to avoid default by selling their property, we also tried 
including mortgage application denial rates in the census tract within the six months prior to the 
month of observation (as opposed to at origination).  Higher current denial rates may indicate more 
stringent underwriting standards for potential buyers, which would hinder the ability of the 
borrower to sell the house, and thus result in higher default rates.  These coefficients were also 
insignificant.  The inclusion of these additional denial rate variables did not change the magnitudes 
or significance of our other results reported in table 3 and these alternate models are not shown in 
the table.11  
 Neighborhood racial composition.  Model 3 of table 3 shows that residing in a census 
tract with a higher proportion of black residents is associated with higher default rates, even after 
controlling for an extensive set of loan and borrower characteristics.  Almost one third of hybrid 
ARMs in our sample were made to borrowers living in tracts that are over 80 percent black.  For 
borrowers in these tracts, the default hazard is over 25 percent higher than that of borrowers in 
tracts with fewer than 20 percent black residents (the reference category).  We do not see significant 
or consistent patterns when we look at the effect of Hispanic or Asian population shares.   
 Comparing models 2 and 3, we see that the loan and borrower coefficients do not change as 
we add more neighborhood characteristics.  However, the addition of the racial composition 
variables reduces the magnitude of the foreclosure rate coefficients, reflecting the positive 
correlation between foreclosure rates and predominantly black neighborhoods.12  And as noted 
                                                 
11 Other census tract level variables that we tried in alternate models included crime rates (property crime, violent crime 
and all crimes) from the city’s police records (the number of crimes reported in the census tract in the preceding 6 
months divided by the tract’s population in the 2000 Census), and the fraction of residents who had moved into the tract 
within the last two years from the 2000 Census.  None of these variables were statistically significant. 
12 We also interacted these racial composition measures with the foreclosure measures but found no effect.   
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above, the inclusion of the neighborhood race variables reduces the magnitude and significance of 
the share of non-prime loans that we found in model 2.   
 Borrower race.  In model 4, we add the race of the primary borrower. 13  Specifically, we 
interact whether the borrower is black with the neighborhood share of black residents.  The 
reference category is non-black borrowers in neighborhoods with fewer than 20 percent black 
residents.  The estimates display a somewhat unexpected pattern.  In neighborhoods that are more 
than 40 percent black, the estimates on the share of black residents are virtually identical across 
borrower race; i.e., the borrower’s own race does not matter much.  Only in neighborhoods with 
fewer than 40 percent black residents do black borrowers have significantly higher default hazards.  
In model 5, we repeat model 4, but remove the variables on neighborhood racial composition, 
leaving in only the primary borrower’s race.  These results reinforce the interpretation that being 
black, by itself, has a limited effect on default: the hazard is only 10 percent higher for black versus 
white borrowers (the reference category).14  Overall, the pattern of coefficients in models 4 and 5 
suggest that the neighborhood share of black residents is as important in explaining default as the 
borrower’s own race.  Results for other borrower and neighborhood races and ethnicity did not yield 
clear patterns, although we find that Hispanic white borrowers tend to have lower default hazards.  
We also included the gender of the primary borrower in models 4 and 5 (coefficients not displayed) 
but the coefficients were small and insignificant.  
 Time-location fixed effects.  The models in table 3 all include calendar quarter fixed 
effects to account for any city-wide macroeconomic factors.  Still, if neighbors have similar 
socioeconomic backgrounds or human capital, job losses in one industry or occupation may be 
                                                 
13 Race and/or ethnicity were missing for 15 percent of ARMs.  The models in table 3 included indicator variables to 
capture this category, but our results do not change if we simply omit these observations from the sample.  Our results 
also do not change if we define “black” to also include Hispanic black, or if we allow “black” to include instances where 
the coborrower is black (almost 90 percent of coborrowers are of the same race and ethnicity as the primary borrower). 
14 Note that this is a different reference category than that used in model 4.     
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concentrated among residents in some neighborhoods.  To control for these more localized time 
varying economic factors and further isolate the census tract level findings, we reestimated model 4 
with a variety of fixed effects that interact calendar time with location.  These include: (i) calendar 
year interacted with community district fixed effects, which removes any annual variation in 
community district level economic factors (the 56 community district boundaries included are 
shown in figure 2), and alternatively, (ii) calendar quarter interacted with 11 geographic areas within 
the City, which removes any quarterly variation in economic factors at this 11 area level of 
geography.15   
When we include these fixed effects, the effect of foreclosure rates is slightly smaller than in 
the models displayed in table 3, but the effects are still significant at 1 percent, and substantial in 
magnitude.  For example, in the second version of these time-location fixed effects, a neighborhood 
foreclosure rate of over 3 percent increases the default hazard by 24 percent relative to mortgages in 
neighborhoods where the foreclosure rate is less than 1 percent.  All the other coefficients, including 
those on the neighborhood racial compositions, were virtually unchanged.  We also ran the models 
in table 3 with annual unemployment rates at the community district level.  These unemployment 
rates were never significant and did not affect the magnitude of the other coefficients.  Taken 
together, these results strongly suggest that most of the estimated neighborhood effects in table 3 
are due to variation at the very local neighborhood level.   
 Zip code level neighborhood characteristics.  To assess whether tract level measures are 
more useful for understanding the determinants of default than measures at higher levels of 
geographic aggregration, we reestimated the models in table 3 including the tract level neighborhood 
variables as shown, as well as their zip code level analogs.  These zip code level variables generally 
                                                 
15 The boundaries for these 11 areas were designated by aggregating the community districts in Manhattan into two 
areas, and those in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens into three areas each.  The 11 areas were roughly equal in size.  
Models that included calendar quarter interacted with community district fixed effects failed to converge. 
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were not statistically significant, and they had little impact on the size or significance of the other 
coefficients, with one exception: the non-prime share of mortgages originated in the zip code during 
the two years prior to the loan’s origination.  These coefficients were positive, monotonically 
increasing and significant, while their census tract level analogs remained insignificant in all of the 
table 3 models.   
Purchases vs. refinances.  Finally, we have estimated all our models separately for home 
purchases and refinance loans.  In table 4, we present the neighborhood foreclosure, REO, racial 
composition and borrower race coefficients associated with model 4 from table 3.  The estimated 
impact of foreclosure rates are similar across the two samples, except that high REO rates have a 
larger and more significant effect on the default hazard for home purchases than on the hazard for 
refinances.  This is consistent with refinance borrowers being more accustomed to both booms and 
busts in the neighborhood and less sensitive to changes caused by neighboring REOs because of 
their presumably longer tenure.      
 We find that the neighborhood racial composition results are stronger in magnitude for 
home purchases than for refinances.  Both black and non-black borrowers in neighborhoods that 
are over 80 percent black have default hazards that are about two thirds higher than the reference 
group (non-black borrowers in neighborhoods with fewer than 20 percent black residents).  By 
contrast, the models for refinance loans do not display this pattern, and in fact, the neighborhood 
race effects are all much smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant.  
 
4.3.  Fixed Rate Mortgage Results 
 Table 5 displays our results for fixed rate mortgages.  In general, the patterns are similar to 
those for the hybrid ARMs.  There are, however, a few notable differences.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients on FICO score and current LTV are larger, which is perhaps unsurprising because there 
 19
is no equivalent to the payment shocks that are very important in explaining the defaults for ARMs.  
FRM borrowers who take out additional new debt have a 12 percent higher default hazard than 
those who do not, whereas this variable had an insignificantly negative effect on ARM defaults.  This 
suggests that being able to secure additional financing does not provide much more information on 
FRM borrower risk, possibly because they are better selected or because underwriting standards are 
more stringent for FRMs.  Instead, the pure effect of a larger debt burden dominates, resulting in a 
positive coefficient on taking on new debt.   
 The effect of foreclosures and REOs remain similar in magnitude and significance as for the 
ARMs.  In terms of neighborhood racial composition, the coefficients on predominantly black 
neighborhoods are larger for FRMs than for ARMs.  In model 3, tracts with more than 40 percent 
black residents have a default hazard that is at least 30 percent higher than tracts with fewer than 20 
percent black residents (the reference category).  Model 4 shows that while borrowers of all races 
have higher default hazards in neighborhoods with higher shares of blacks, non-black borrowers 
tend to have even higher default hazards than do black borrowers in those neighborhoods.  Relative 
to the reference category (non-black borrowers in 0-20 percent black neighborhoods), non-black 
borrowers in 80-100 percent black neighborhoods have default hazards that are 52 percent higher, 
while black borrowers in these mostly black neighborhoods have default hazards that are only 28 
percent higher.  In model 5, where we remove neighborhood racial composition, the coefficient on 
being a black borrower is itself small and insignificant.  
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5.  Possible Interpretations of the Neighborhood Results 
 
 Our results indicate that neighborhood characteristics play a significant role in default 
outcomes, beyond the effects of loan and individual borrower characteristics.  We find that as the 
rate of foreclosure notices filed and the number of REOs in the neighborhood increases, the hazard 
of default increases, even after controlling for a host of other variables.  We also find that home 
purchase borrowers living in predominantly black neighborhoods are more likely to enter default, 
regardless of the race of the individual borrower living in such neighborhoods.  In this section, we 
consider possible interpretations of these results.  While this will be necessarily speculative, it is 
important for us to consider because the plausible explanations for our findings have important 
policy implications. 
 Neighborhood foreclosure rates and REO activity.  The most direct interpretation of 
our findings on foreclosures and REOs is that there are contagion effects at play.  Neighbors may 
share information about the efficacy of default or the foreclosure process, leading other neighbors 
struggling with mortgage payments and negative equity to enter into default.  High neighborhood 
foreclosure rates may also reduce the stigma associated with defaulting on a mortgage, making it 
more likely that others default as well.  Survey results indicate that underwater homeowners who 
know people who have defaulted are more willing to default than those who have not been exposed, 
although a majority of survey respondents still say it is “immoral” or “unacceptable” for 
homeowners to stop making their mortgage payments (Guiso et al., 2009; Morin, 2010).   
 Foreclosure and REO concentrations could also be serving as proxies for omitted variables.  
They could, for example, be picking up local economic conditions, because income and employment 
shocks are correlated with defaults and foreclosures.  However, as discussed above, adding 
community district level unemployment rates had no impact on the foreclosure and REO estimates.  
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Further, because tracts with high foreclosure and REO rates are geographically concentrated in 
particular community districts16, the fact that controlling for calendar year interacted with 
community district fixed effects in our hazard models only slightly reduces the estimated impact of 
foreclosures and REOs suggests that these omitted variable interpretations are quite limited in 
importance.   
 Measurement error in house price appreciation may also cause some of the apparent effect 
of foreclosures and REO.  Because the foreclosure and REO variables are measured at the census 
tract level, while our house price indices are at the larger community district level, less house price 
appreciation in higher foreclosure tracts would lead to systematically overestimated housing values 
and underestimated current LTVs for loans in high foreclosure neighborhoods.17  As noted earlier, 
other research has shown that foreclosures and REOs can lead to diminished house price 
appreciation.  Further, foreclosure rates may reflect expectations about future house price 
depreciation that are not already captured in price indices based on recent sales transactions.   
 In sum, we interpret our finding that default hazards increase with higher recent foreclosure 
and REO activity in the neighborhood to be reflecting some combination of a contagion effect and 
a proxy effect for very local house price fluctuations.  To a much lesser extent, the foreclosure and 
REO rates may also serve as a proxy for neighborhood economic conditions or unobserved 
borrower characteristics.   
 Neighborhood racial composition.  We find that borrowers in predominantly black 
neighborhoods also have higher default rates, regardless of race, even after controlling for a host of 
other borrower, loan, and neighborhood characteristics.  The most obvious interpretation of this 
                                                 
16 For example, during the first six months of 2008, 55 percent of tracts experiencing a foreclosure rate of at least 3 
percent were located in just five community districts. 
17 Indeed, because borrowers with positive equity can avoid default by selling their property, the fact that current LTVs 
ranging from 60 to 90 are positive and significant in our default models suggests that our LTV measure is 
underestimated.  If it were possible to use good repeat sales indices at the census tract level, our current LTV measure 
would be more accurate and the foreclosure effects would likely be reduced.  In a study of Los Angeles County, Aragon 
et al. (2010) argue that even repeat sales indices at the zip code level are poor predictors of individual property values.   
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finding is that the share of black residents is proxying for unobserved borrower and loan 
characteristics common in those neighborhoods that are correlated with higher default rates.  But 
these unobservables must be ones that apply only to home purchase and not to refinance borrowers, 
because we find no neighborhood racial composition effect for the latter.  In considering plausible 
candidates for such unobservables, it is useful to divide them into (i) factors that lenders and others 
involved in the loan’s origination know (or can learn) and that may be used to treat borrowers in 
black neighborhoods differently from borrowers in other neighborhoods, and (ii) factors that are 
not known to lenders and others.   
 In the first category, variations in lending and underwriting practices across census tracts that 
are unobserved in our data could lead to systematically different borrower and loan characteristics in 
certain tracts.  For example, if underwriters used less stringent or improper standards for mortgage 
applicants in black neighborhoods, then borrowers in those neighborhoods likely would have 
relatively higher default risk, even after controlling for FICO scores and other observable risk 
factors.  Similarly, if borrowers in black neighborhoods paid higher upfront fees, they likely would 
be less able to overcome income shocks and thus more likely to default, all else equal.  Despite our 
rich set of loan specific variables, we are not able to account for all underwriting standards or for 
any upfront fees that were paid at origination.18  Another possibility is that borrowers in black 
neighborhoods were more likely to use a mortgage broker, perhaps due to relatively limited financial 
sophistication or just limited access to local bank branches that makes it more costly to shop around 
for a mortgage.  While we cannot discern the use of brokers in our data, others have found that 
loans involving brokers are more likely to enter default (Coulton et al., 2008; Laderman and Reid, 
2008).  The higher default rate might be because brokers’ earnings depend upon both the success of 
the application and the loan amount, and brokers therefore have more incentive than borrowers 
                                                 
18 Haughwout et al. (2009) find that borrowers in zip codes with higher proportions of black or Hispanic residents pay 
slightly lower adjustable mortgage interest rates.  However, they were also not able to control for upfront fees. 
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applying without a broker to provide inaccurate information in the application (for example, an 
inflated appraisal).  Or, the higher default rate may reflect aggressive marketing tactics some brokers 
use, which may make it more difficult for borrowers to evaluate the broker’s offerings and more 
likely the borrower will accept an inappropriate loan. 
Each of these possible unobservables should be less relevant for refinance loans.  Refinance 
borrowers have undergone earlier screening by another party (the underwriter of their previous 
mortgage), and have demonstrated that they can carry a mortgage, at least up to the time of their 
refinance, so unobserved underwriting standards should matter less for refinancings than for home 
purchase loans.  Refinance borrowers should also be less susceptible to aggressive marketing tactics 
because they are not first time homebuyers and may be more financially literate as a result of their 
prior homeowning and borrowing experience.19  While we cannot rule out the possibility that other 
unobservable factors explain the effects we find, the factors we have mentioned are likely to be the 
best candidates because they are consistent with the different effect neighborhood racial 
composition has on defaults for purchase and refinance loans.    
The hypothesis that differential lending practices in black neighborhoods lead to higher 
default rates also is supported by our results on non-prime loan concentrations.  Model 2 of table 3 
shows that loans in neighborhoods with higher non-prime shares at origination have higher default 
hazards, even after controlling for a large set of loan and borrower characteristics.  The non-prime 
share of mortgages may be proxying for an omitted variable, “differential lending practices,” that 
results in both more non-prime loans and higher default rates.  However, the coefficients on the 
share of non-prime loans become smaller and insignificant once we include the neighborhood racial 
                                                 
19 Some have argued that refinancings were targeted for “equity-stripping” by unscrupulous originators seeking high fees 
or other unfavorable terms that would serve to transfer the homeowner’s equity to the originator or lender.  Refinances 
make an attractive target because there is often more equity to strip.  Whatever the extent of such practices may have 
been, it does not undercut the present argument.  Refinance borrowers have gone through the mortgage application 
process and have been approved at least once before.  As such, they are likely to be more financially knowledgeable and 
more financially sound than home purchase borrowers.  While originators may have targeted refinance borrowers for the 
very worst loans, it does not follow that refinance borrowers would be more likely to accept loans on poor terms. 
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composition variables in model 3 of table 3.  This suggests that the share of black residents is an 
even better proxy for this missing indicator.  We found a similar result when we added variables 
capturing the share of riskier mortgage types (hybrid ARMs and no- and low-documentation loans) 
in the loan’s census tract at origination.  Consistent with Agarwal et al. (2011), these variables are 
positive and significant in explaining default when we do not also control for neighborhood racial 
composition.  But, the addition of the share of black residents in the tract renders the coefficients on 
the shares of riskier loans small and insignificant.  Thus, the share of riskier loans at origination is in 
some sense picking up the outcome of differential lending practices, while the differential practices 
themselves are better captured by the share of black residents, as measured in the 2000 Census.   
 We now turn to the second category of factors, those that are not known to lenders and 
others.  There may be a systematic difference, unobserved in our data and unknown to lenders, 
between individuals living in predominantly black neighborhoods and those living elsewhere.  It is 
difficult, however, to think of plausible candidates for such a difference that applies to home 
purchase borrowers but not to refinance borrowers.  The unobserved factor would have to be 
associated with home purchase borrowers of all races living in black neighborhoods being less likely 
to repay (compared to home purchase borrowers in non-black neighborhoods), that is distinct from 
factors that are observable to the underwriter like income stability or asset reserves, and that does 
not affect refinance borrowers differentially by neighborhood racial composition.20  Moreover, given 
the magnitude of our estimates, the importance of these unobservables would need to be 
considerable if they were solely responsible for our findings.  In the absence of reasonable 
candidates for such unobserved variables, we interpret our results as being less likely to be driven by 
                                                 
20 Possible candidates might involve innate borrower characteristics such as the ethic to repay loans.  The argument 
would be that borrowers living in black neighborhoods lack this unobservable ethic.  However, it is hard to come up 
with a story as to why home purchase borrowers in black neighborhoods would lack this ethic compared to those living 
in other neighborhoods, whereas refinance borrowers do not vary across black and non-black neighborhoods.     
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such unknown unobservables, and more likely to be due to the unobserved factors associated with 
differential lending practices discussed above.  
  Another possible interpretation of our neighborhood race findings is that the share of black 
residents is proxying for local economic conditions and exposure to adverse shocks.  However, as 
we noted in the discussion of foreclosure and REO rates above, predominantly black tracts are 
geographically concentrated21 and adding calendar year interacted with community district fixed 
effects does not change the coefficients on neighborhood racial composition.  This makes it unlikely 
that the share of black residents is just a proxy for local unemployment or other local concerns.   
 Finally, we consider how measurement error may influence our neighborhood race findings.  
Similar to the discussion above for foreclosures and REOs, it is possible that predominantly black 
census tracts experience less house price appreciation than the surrounding community district, 
leading to a systematic underestimate of the current LTV for loans in predominantly black 
neighborhoods.  Of course, this raises the question of why these particular neighborhoods have 
poorer housing price performance.  To investigate this measurement error possibility further, we 
reestimated model 4 of table 3 for two separate samples: ARMs in non-black neighborhoods (less 
than 40 percent black residents) and ARMs in black neighborhoods (more than 60 percent black 
residents).  We find that the coefficients on current LTV for the black neighborhood sample are 
smaller than for the non-black, while statistical significance remains at one percent for both samples.  
Underestimated current LTV in black neighborhoods would have implied the opposite result, 
suggesting that this source of measurement error cannot be solely responsible for our findings.22   
                                                 
21 For example, 78 percent of tracts that have over 80 percent black residents are located in just five community districts. 
22 A second source of possible measurement error could come from misreported borrower race, such that the 
neighborhood racial composition becomes a proxy for the individual’s race and the coefficients on individual race 
become small and insignificant.  In the HMDA data, race is usually self-reported, but if the individual does not specify a 
race, the lender can record a subjective assessment, which could lead to misreporting error.  To the extent that black 
borrowers believe that there is racial discrimination in lending, they may have an incentive to misreport their race, 
especially if the loan application is not made in person.  However, we know of no empirical evidence that suggests that 
HMDA race classifications are systematically in error.   
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 In sum, we think that the most likely explanation of our neighborhood racial composition 
findings is that the non-prime mortgage industry (brokers, lenders, underwriters, etc.) treated black 
neighborhoods differently in terms of marketing and underwriting practices or loan terms in ways 
that are unobserved in our data.  However, our data and results do not allow us to discern the 
reasons for or the nature of this differential treatment.  One possibility is that some non-prime 
lenders and brokers “targeted” minority neighborhoods with inappropriately priced loans and 
improper underwriting.23  Our results are also consistent with the existence of institutional pressures 
to extend more credit to these neighborhoods, to boost homeownership rates, or simply to tap new 
markets, by employing strong marketing tactics or more lenient underwriting standards.24  
Unfortunately, we do not have detailed data on the underwriting process or marketing campaigns.  
Without such crucial information, we are unable to directly examine the role of these factors.   
 
   
6.  Conclusion 
 
Our rich data set allows us to improve upon the existing literature by assessing the impact 
that borrower characteristics, the type of loan and its terms, and the characteristics of the 
neighborhood (measured at the census tract level) have on the probability that a non-prime 
                                                 
23 The targeting hypothesis has been stated most starkly in litigation some cities have filed against various lenders.  
Baltimore, for example, has accused Wells Fargo of “target[ing] these kinds of predatory practices [‘charging excessive 
fees; charging excessively high interest rates that are not justified by borrowers’ creditworthiness; requiring large 
prepayment penalties while deliberately misleading borrowers about the penalties; using deceptive sales practices to wrap 
insurance products into mortgages; convincing borrowers to refinance mortgages into new loans that only benefit Wells 
Fargo; deceiving borrowers into believing that they are getting fixed rate loans when they are really getting adjustable rate 
loans’] at African-American neighborhoods and residents.”  Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo N.A., 
Case No. 1:08-cv-00062-JFM (D.Md. April 7, 2010). 
24 Although some commentators have faulted federal policies like the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) for creating 
pressure for imprudent lending in low-income neighborhoods, there is evidence that challenges this argument (e.g., see 
Laderman and Reid, 2008).  Because the loans in our study were originated by non-depository institutions, they do not 
qualify for CRA credit and thus the CRA is not a plausible explanation for this finding.  
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mortgage will default.  Similar to existing research on mortgage defaults using loan level data, we 
find that the current LTV, borrower credit scores and debt-to-income ratios at origination, interest 
rates, loan size, ARM margins and payment shocks upon rate adjustment are all significant in 
explaining default behavior.  We further show that, other than LTV, the magnitude of the estimates 
on these loan and borrower risk characteristics do not change when we add a variety of census tract 
level controls to capture very local neighborhood characteristics such as foreclosure and REO 
activity, racial composition, and the share of existing non-prime mortgages.  This is an important 
finding that confirms the validity of most existing research on mortgage defaults that only have data 
on the loan and borrower risk variables, and not the rich neighborhood level information that we are 
able to use here.    
 Regarding the role of neighborhood characteristics in non-prime mortgage default risk, we 
uncover several new facts.  First, default rates increase as the rate of foreclosure notices and the 
number of REOs in the neighborhood increases, even after controlling for a rich set of loan and 
borrower risk characteristics.  We argue that this likely reflects a contagion effect, or that foreclosure 
and REO rates may be serving as proxies for weak neighborhood housing market conditions that 
are not already captured in the community district level price indices.  At first blush, it seems hardly 
surprising that defaults are higher in high foreclosure and REO areas.  However, what we have 
shown is that this effect is happening at an extremely local level.  Our estimates remain large and 
significant when we include fixed effects for calendar year interacted with the 56 community districts 
in our New York City sample.  These findings suggest that efforts to target foreclosure avoidance 
programs such as loan modifications must take account of extremely local differences in the 
concentration and effects of foreclosures.   
 Second, we find that home purchase loans in census tracts with larger shares of black 
residents have higher default risk, even after controlling for an extensive set of loan and borrower 
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characteristics, including the borrower’s own race.  After considering a variety of potential 
explanations, we argue that this result most plausibly reflects differential treatment of black 
neighborhoods by the mortgage industry.  However, the exact nature or cause of this differential 
treatment is not something that our data can address.  Perhaps black neighborhoods were “targeted” 
for unsustainable non-prime loans that were inappropriate in pricing or other terms, or perhaps 
these neighborhoods were subject to low quality or less stringent underwriting practices.  Untangling 
these possibilities would require additional loan-level information on the marketing and underwriting 
process.  This is an important issue for future research.   
 Our finding that neighborhood characteristics have significant effects on default suggests 
that policymakers should take neighborhood context into account in designing their responses to the 
foreclosure crisis, and in shaping the regulation of mortgage products and lending practices.  
Neighborhoods matter: the risk that a borrower will default is not just a function of the borrower’s 
characteristics, the loan terms, and economic trends, but also depends significantly on the 
neighborhood in which the borrower lives.  Accordingly, neighborhood level efforts may be 
necessary to reduce default risk, and to address the consequences of default.   
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Data Appendix 
Using a hierarchical matching algorithm, we were able to match 93 percent of the LoanPerformance 
sample (as described in section 3) to deeds from the New York City Department of Finance 
(DOF)’s Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS).25  This gave us the exact location of 
the property and allowed us to merge on: building characteristics from the DOF’s tax assessment 
records, repeat sales house price indices for 56 different community districts from the Furman 
Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy26, tract characteristics from the 2000 Census, tract shares of 
various types of mortgage originations and loan application denial rates using Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) data coupled with LoanPerformance, the tract rate of mortgage foreclosure 
notices (lis pendens), the tract share of properties owned by lenders (REOs)27, annual unemployment 
rates in each community district from the American Community Survey, and monthly tract level 
crime rates from the New York City Police Department.  We also merged the deeds with HMDA 
data to get additional borrower characteristics for each loan.28  Of the original LoanPerformance 
sample, 78 percent matched both the deeds records and HMDA. 
                                                 
25 Our procedure for matching LoanPerformance to ACRIS is similar to the method used by Haughwout et al. (2009) to 
match LoanPerformance to HMDA.  Our data from ACRIS do not include Staten Island and thus we had to drop this 
borough from our analysis.  We merged LoanPerformance loans to ACRIS mortgage deeds using three common fields: 
origination or deed date, loan amount and zip code, using six stages of hierarchical matching.  At the end of each stage, 
loans and deeds that uniquely matched each other were set aside and considered matched, while all other loans and 
deeds enter the next stage.  Stage 1 matched loans and deeds on the raw values of date, loan amount and zip code.  Stage 
2 matched the remaining loans and deeds on the raw values of date and zip code, and the loan amount rounded to 
$1,000.  Stage 3 matched on the raw values of date and zip code, and the loan amount rounded to $10,000.  Stage 4 
matched on the raw values of zip code and loan amount, and allowed dates to differ by up to 90 days.  Stage 5 matched 
on the raw value of zip code, loan amount rounded to $1,000, and allowed dates to differ by up to 90 days.  Stage 6 
matched on the raw value of zip code, loan amount rounded to $10,000, and allowed dates to differ by up to 90 days.  
We believe it is valid to introduce a 90-day window because for a good fraction of LoanPerformance loans, the 
origination date is imputed by backdating the first payment date by one month, and in ACRIS, there may be 
administrative lags in the recording of the deeds data.  The chance of false positive matching is low because we are 
matching loans to the full universe of deed records, and only considering unique matches. 
26 See Furman Center (2009) for a description.  We transform quarterly into monthly series by linear interpolation.  
27 The lis pendens are from Public Data Corporation and the REOs are from DOF property sales data. 
28 We merged HMDA records to ACRIS deeds based on date, loan amount and census tract, using the same six stage 
hierarchical matching technique as for the LoanPerformance-ACRIS match.  We then uniquely paired the 
LoanPerformance records with HMDA records based on the unique deed identification number from ACRIS.  While 
other researchers have matched loan level data directly to HMDA by using the zip code as a common geographic 
identifier, our matching strategy is likely more reliable as it uses a more precise geographical identifier (census tract).   
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Table 1: Loan and Borrower Characteristics
Adjustable Rate Fixed Rate
Mortgages Mortgages
Average loan amount $352,461 $360,614
Owner-occupier 0.909 0.880
Average interest rate at origination 7.4 6.9
Average relative interest rate at origination1 4.3 0.9
Average ARM margin2 5.9
Payment shock at first ARM adjustment3:
<20% 0.975
20-30% 0.014
>30% 0.011
Average FICO score at origination 621 665
Debt-to-income at origination > 45%4 0.424 0.361
Average combined LTV at origination 74.4 69.4
Took on additional mortgage debt5 0.051 0.108
Full documentation 0.382 0.419
Has coborrower 0.206 0.284
Primary borrower race/ethnicity6:
White 0.224 0.311
Black 0.461 0.368
Hispanic white 0.152 0.141
Asian 0.093 0.111
Other 0.070 0.068
Number of loans 30,307 29,414
2 Percentage points added to the six-month LIBOR to determine the interest rate at future rate adjustments.
3 The jump in monthly payments that 2/28 borrowers experience at month 25 and 3/27 borrowers experience at month 37.
4 DTI is missing for 19% of ARMs and 38% of FRMs.  
5 Additional mortgage debt was secured that totaled at least 5% of the original loan amount.
6 Race/ethnicity is missing for 15% of ARMs and 20% of FRMs.
Source: LoanPerformance New York City sample, as described in the text.
1 For ARMs: interest rate minus the six-month LIBOR rate at origination.  For FRMs: interest rate minus the Freddie Mac 
average interest rate for prime 30-year FRMs at origination.  Expressed in percentage points.
Table indicates the fraction of records in each category, unless otherwise noted.
Table 2: Neighborhood Characteristics
Adjustable Rate Fixed Rate
Mortgages Mortgages
Census tract demographics from 2000 Census
Median income: <$30,000 0.230 0.211
$30,000-$40,000 0.261 0.253
>$40,000 0.509 0.535
% High school graduates: <70% 0.465 0.421
70-80% 0.342 0.326
>80% 0.193 0.252
% Non-native born <20% 0.119 0.129
20-40% 0.466 0.445
40-60% 0.351 0.353
>60% 0.064 0.074
% Black 0-20% 0.296 0.424
20-40% 0.105 0.097
40-60% 0.104 0.082
60-80% 0.162 0.136
80-100% 0.333 0.261
% Hispanic 0-20% 0.611 0.618
20-40% 0.190 0.192
40-100% 0.199 0.190
% Asian 0-20% 0.913 0.883
20-40% 0.076 0.097
40-100% 0.011 0.020
Census tract loan composition at origination
Share of non-prime loans1 <10% 0.079 0.141
10-20% 0.332 0.359
20-30% 0.529 0.445
>30% 0.060 0.054
Number of loans 30,307 29,414
Census tract foreclosure and REO activity (dynamic)
Recent foreclosure rate2 <1% 0.526 0.555
1-2% 0.292 0.246
2-3% 0.111 0.113
>3% 0.071 0.085
Recent REO rate3 <1% 0.648 0.675
1-2% 0.132 0.113
2-3% 0.077 0.068
>3% 0.142 0.144
Number of loan-months 503,579 946,922
3 The number of properties listed as REO in the 6 months preceding the analysis month / The stock of buildings.  
Table indicates fraction of records in each category.  Italics indicate category omitted from hazard models in tables 3-5.
1 The number of non-prime loans originated in the Loan Performance database / Total loans originated in HMDA during 
the 6 months preceding the loan's origination.
2 The number of lis pendens  filed in the 6 months preceding the analysis month / The stock of buildings.  
Table 3: Hazard Models of Default for Adjustable Rate Mortgages
Loan characteristics
Relative interest rate at origination:
2-4 1.256 (0.063) ** 1.243 (0.063) ** 1.236 (0.063) ** 1.241 (0.063) ** 1.240 (0.063) **
4-6 1.777 (0.106) ** 1.723 (0.103) ** 1.699 (0.102) ** 1.707 (0.103) ** 1.713 (0.102) **
>6 3.484 (0.265) ** 3.329 (0.258) ** 3.279 (0.256) ** 3.294 (0.256) ** 3.299 (0.253) **
ARM Margin: 5-6% 1.145 (0.047) ** 1.126 (0.047) ** 1.122 (0.046) ** 1.121 (0.047) ** 1.127 (0.047) **
6-7% 1.310 (0.050) ** 1.291 (0.050) ** 1.283 (0.050) ** 1.283 (0.050) ** 1.294 (0.050) **
>7% 1.503 (0.086) ** 1.473 (0.085) ** 1.468 (0.085) ** 1.465 (0.085) ** 1.477 (0.085) **
3-6 months post-adjustment and:
payment shock <20%   1.169 (0.100) 1.173 (0.100) 1.177 (0.101) 1.177 (0.101) 1.177 (0.100)
payment shock 20-30% 1.216 (0.137) 1.199 (0.135) 1.204 (0.136) 1.206 (0.136) 1.207 (0.136)
payment shock >30%   1.631 (0.203) ** 1.625 (0.203) ** 1.627 (0.203) ** 1.626 (0.203) ** 1.623 (0.203) **
7-12 months post-adjustment and:
payment shock <20%   1.397 (0.117) ** 1.400 (0.116) ** 1.406 (0.117) ** 1.405 (0.117) ** 1.405 (0.117) **
payment shock 20-30% 1.735 (0.171) ** 1.697 (0.167) ** 1.703 (0.167) ** 1.713 (0.168) ** 1.717 (0.168) **
payment shock >30%   1.939 (0.228) ** 1.919 (0.226) ** 1.920 (0.225) ** 1.928 (0.225) ** 1.924 (0.225) **
FICO score at origination: 680-720 1.205 (0.058) ** 1.208 (0.057) ** 1.202 (0.057) ** 1.207 (0.058) ** 1.209 (0.058) **
650-680 1.312 (0.061) ** 1.311 (0.060) ** 1.307 (0.060) ** 1.304 (0.061) ** 1.304 (0.061) **
620-650 1.499 (0.069) ** 1.499 (0.070) ** 1.489 (0.070) ** 1.489 (0.070) ** 1.489 (0.070) **
590-620 1.490 (0.079) ** 1.505 (0.080) ** 1.494 (0.079) ** 1.492 (0.080) ** 1.491 (0.080) **
560-590 1.783 (0.099) ** 1.816 (0.101) ** 1.810 (0.101) ** 1.806 (0.101) ** 1.797 (0.100) **
530-560 1.889 (0.110) ** 1.937 (0.115) ** 1.928 (0.114) ** 1.920 (0.113) ** 1.913 (0.113) **
<530 1.864 (0.123) ** 1.919 (0.129) ** 1.902 (0.128) ** 1.899 (0.128) ** 1.895 (0.127) **
Debt-to-income at origination >45% 1.127 (0.029) ** 1.130 (0.029) ** 1.132 (0.029) ** 1.129 (0.029) ** 1.128 (0.029) **
Current combined LTV: 60-70% 1.178 (0.054) ** 1.127 (0.051) ** 1.111 (0.051) * 1.113 (0.051) * 1.126 (0.051) **
70-80% 1.423 (0.061) ** 1.327 (0.056) ** 1.302 (0.055) ** 1.307 (0.056) ** 1.328 (0.056) **
80-90% 1.618 (0.076) ** 1.478 (0.070) ** 1.443 (0.069) ** 1.447 (0.069) ** 1.475 (0.070) **
90-95% 2.201 (0.124) ** 1.980 (0.112) ** 1.935 (0.110) ** 1.938 (0.110) ** 1.975 (0.112) **
95-100% 2.340 (0.147) ** 2.094 (0.132) ** 2.048 (0.129) ** 2.053 (0.129) ** 2.089 (0.131) **
>100% 2.284 (0.142) ** 1.964 (0.125) ** 1.917 (0.123) ** 1.922 (0.123) ** 1.965 (0.125) **
continued
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Took on additional mortgage debt 0.929 (0.039) 0.944 (0.039) 0.942 (0.039) 0.945 (0.039) 0.946 (0.039)
Has coborrower 0.754 (0.024) ** 0.775 (0.024) ** 0.778 (0.024) ** 0.780 (0.025) ** 0.779 (0.025) **
Home purchase 1.377 (0.097) ** 1.374 (0.095) ** 1.377 (0.096) ** 1.389 (0.097) ** 1.389 (0.096) **
Owner-occupier 1.311 (0.054) ** 1.350 (0.057) ** 1.357 (0.057) ** 1.371 (0.058) ** 1.370 (0.057) **
Full documentation 1.003 (0.156) 0.987 (0.151) 0.976 (0.148) 0.958 (0.143) 0.960 (0.144)
Non-racial neighborhood characteristics
Median income: <$30,000 1.195 (0.044) ** 1.172 (0.046) ** 1.146 (0.045) ** 1.166 (0.043) **
$30,000-$40,000 1.077 (0.032) * 1.067 (0.032) * 1.062 (0.032) * 1.074 (0.032) *
% High school graduates: 70-80% 0.996 (0.030) 0.939 (0.030) * 0.938 (0.030) * 0.964 (0.029)
>80% 0.977 (0.036) 0.915 (0.037) * 0.903 (0.037) * 0.925 (0.035) *
% Non-native born: 20-40% 0.914 (0.036) * 0.924 (0.037) * 0.917 (0.036) * 0.918 (0.035) *
40-60% 0.870 (0.036) ** 0.893 (0.038) ** 0.886 (0.037) ** 0.871 (0.036) **
>60% 0.659 (0.044) ** 0.717 (0.049) ** 0.721 (0.048) ** 0.684 (0.044) **
Recent foreclosure rate: 1-2% 1.220 (0.035) ** 1.151 (0.034) ** 1.149 (0.034) ** 1.191 (0.034) **
2-3% 1.303 (0.050) ** 1.207 (0.047) ** 1.206 (0.047) ** 1.263 (0.048) **
>3% 1.392 (0.062) ** 1.270 (0.058) ** 1.268 (0.058) ** 1.341 (0.060) **
Recent REO rate: 1-2% 1.076 (0.039) * 1.056 (0.038) 1.059 (0.039) 1.070 (0.039)
2-3% 1.070 (0.045) 1.047 (0.044) 1.047 (0.044) 1.061 (0.045)
>3% 1.140 (0.041) ** 1.116 (0.041) ** 1.119 (0.041) ** 1.136 (0.041) **
Share of non-prime loans: 10-20% 1.135 (0.061) * 1.091 (0.060) 1.093 (0.060) 1.127 (0.061) *
20-30% 1.182 (0.065) ** 1.069 (0.062) 1.066 (0.062) 1.142 (0.064) *
>30% 1.257 (0.083) ** 1.139 (0.079) 1.137 (0.079) 1.217 (0.081) **
continued
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Neighborhood racial composition
% Hispanic: 20-40% 1.023 (0.041) 1.045 (0.041)
40-100% 0.945 (0.045) 0.993 (0.047)
% Asian: 20-40% 0.931 (0.048) 0.948 (0.049)
40-100% 0.930 (0.137) 0.951 (0.139)
% Black: 20-40% 1.111 (0.049) *
40-60% 1.189 (0.054) **
60-80% 1.209 (0.062) **
80-100% 1.268 (0.060) **
Borrower race/ethnicity
Black borrower and neighborhood is:
0-20% black 1.258 (0.113) **
20-40% black 1.291 (0.097) **
40-60% black 1.183 (0.073) **
60-80% black 1.255 (0.074) **
80-100% black 1.278 (0.067) **
Non-black borrower and neighborhood is:
20-40% black 1.068 (0.055)
40-60% black 1.175 (0.076) *
60-80% black 1.228 (0.086) **
80-100% black 1.310 (0.082) **
Black borrower 1.098 (0.037) **
Hispanic white borrower 0.829 (0.036) ** 0.804 (0.033)
Asian borrower 0.937 (0.043) 0.919 (0.041)
Number of loan-months
Number of loans
Log pseudolikelihood
503,579
30,307
-76609.448-76621.404
All models include: a cubic in original loan balance; indicators for 3/27s, prepayment penalty in effect, cash-out refinance, second home, low documentation, property type 
(single & 2-4 family), building age (0-10, 11-50, >50 years & missing), >12 months post-adjustment and payment shock is <20, 20-30 & >30%; indicators for missing 
values of FICO, DTI, prepayment penalty; and fixed effects for origination year and calendar quarter.  Models 4 and 5 also include indicators for Hispanic black, Hispanic 
other race, non-Hispanic other race, missing race, female and missing gender.
Cox proportional hazard models of 90-day default, hazard ratios reported.  See tables 1 and 2 for notes on explanatory variables and the left-out categories.  
Robust standard errors clustered by census tracts are reported in ( ).  Statistical significance is indicated by: *5% and **1%.
-76588.244-76861.238 -76653.936
Table 4: Hazard Models of Default for Adjustable Rate Mortgages - Home Purchases
and Refinances
Recent foreclosure rate: 1-2% 1.149 (0.034) ** 1.136 (0.045) ** 1.167 (0.050) **
2-3% 1.206 (0.047) ** 1.202 (0.064) ** 1.197 (0.066) **
>3% 1.268 (0.058) ** 1.244 (0.076) ** 1.296 (0.084) **
Recent REO rate: 1-2% 1.059 (0.039) 1.133 (0.055) ** 0.986 (0.049)
2-3% 1.047 (0.044) 1.149 (0.070) * 0.954 (0.057)
>3% 1.119 (0.041) ** 1.198 (0.058) ** 1.015 (0.055)
% Hispanic: 20-40% 1.045 (0.041) 1.122 (0.064) * 0.953 (0.053)
40-100% 0.993 (0.047) 1.072 (0.075)  0.913 (0.064)
% Asian: 20-40% 0.948 (0.049) 0.984 (0.069)  0.925 (0.071)
40-100% 0.951 (0.139) 0.948 (0.197)  0.975 (0.185)
Black borrower and neighborhood is:
0-20% black 1.258 (0.113) ** 1.463 (0.169) ** 1.143 (0.155)
20-40% black 1.291 (0.097) ** 1.570 (0.174) ** 1.072 (0.104)
40-60% black 1.183 (0.073) ** 1.566 (0.139) ** 0.910 (0.081)
60-80% black 1.255 (0.074) ** 1.652 (0.133) ** 0.943 (0.077)
80-100% black 1.278 (0.067) ** 1.691 (0.136) ** 0.980 (0.073)
Non-black borrower and neighborhood is:
20-40% black 1.068 (0.055) 1.058 (0.073)  1.125 (0.087)
40-60% black 1.175 (0.076) * 1.318 (0.113) ** 1.018 (0.091)
60-80% black 1.228 (0.086) ** 1.345 (0.138) ** 1.145 (0.113)
80-100% black 1.310 (0.082) ** 1.643 (0.143) ** 1.020 (0.096)
Hispanic white borrower 0.829 (0.036) ** 0.896 (0.051)  0.789 (0.051) **
Asian borrower 0.937 (0.043) 0.938 (0.057)  1.008 (0.075)
Number of loan-months
Number of loans
Log pseudolikelihood
All ARMs Home Purchases Refinances
304,875503,579 198,680
All models include: a cubic in original loan balance; indicators for 3/27s, prepayment penalty in effect, second home, low 
documentation, property type (single & 2-4 family), building age (0-10, 11-50, >50 years & missing), >12 months post-
adjustment and payment shock is <20, 20-30 & >30%, Hispanic black, Hispanic other race, non-Hispanic other race, 
female; indicators for missing values of FICO, DTI, prepayment penalty, race, gender; and fixed effects for origination 
year and calendar quarter.  The refinance model also includes an indicator for cash-out refinance.
Cox proportional hazard models of 90-day default, hazard ratios reported.
Robust standard errors clustered by census tracts are reported in ( ).  Statistical significance is indicated by: *5% and **1%.
See tables 1 and 2 for notes on explanatory variables and the left-out categories.  
30,307 11,931 18,376
-36244.342 -34292.662-76588.244
Table 5: Hazard Models of Default for Fixed Rate Mortgages
Loan characteristics
Relative interest rate at origination:
0-1 1.459 (0.087) ** 1.456 (0.087) ** 1.451 (0.087) ** 1.456 (0.087) ** 1.463 (0.087) **
1-2 2.327 (0.148) ** 2.286 (0.145) ** 2.262 (0.144) ** 2.273 (0.144) ** 2.300 (0.146) **
2-3 3.685 (0.281) ** 3.546 (0.267) ** 3.462 (0.260) ** 3.483 (0.264) ** 3.557 (0.269) **
>3 4.690 (0.439) ** 4.499 (0.423) ** 4.422 (0.417) ** 4.434 (0.418) ** 4.487 (0.423) **
FICO score at origination: 680-720 1.732 (0.084) ** 1.722 (0.084) ** 1.725 (0.084) ** 1.727 (0.084) ** 1.722 (0.084) **
650-680 2.197 (0.113) ** 2.166 (0.111) ** 2.163 (0.111) ** 2.169 (0.112) ** 2.162 (0.111) **
620-650 2.943 (0.152) ** 2.918 (0.150) ** 2.902 (0.149) ** 2.897 (0.149) ** 2.900 (0.150) **
590-620 3.526 (0.216) ** 3.487 (0.213) ** 3.471 (0.212) ** 3.469 (0.213) ** 3.475 (0.213) **
560-590 4.179 (0.298) ** 4.168 (0.298) ** 4.152 (0.297) ** 4.105 (0.294) ** 4.098 (0.294) **
530-560 4.760 (0.397) ** 4.702 (0.392) ** 4.722 (0.392) ** 4.645 (0.389) ** 4.621 (0.388) **
<530 5.183 (0.522) ** 5.226 (0.532) ** 5.292 (0.540) ** 5.191 (0.533) ** 5.135 (0.526) **
Debt-to-income at origination >45% 1.102 (0.040) ** 1.094 (0.040) * 1.091 (0.040) * 1.088 (0.040) * 1.091 (0.040) *
Current combined LTV: 60-70% 1.247 (0.065) ** 1.167 (0.061) ** 1.150 (0.060) ** 1.149 (0.060) ** 1.166 (0.061) **
70-80% 1.521 (0.082) ** 1.383 (0.075) ** 1.358 (0.073) ** 1.354 (0.073) ** 1.380 (0.074) **
80-90% 1.988 (0.107) ** 1.758 (0.096) ** 1.722 (0.093) ** 1.714 (0.093) ** 1.750 (0.095) **
90-95% 2.631 (0.176) ** 2.261 (0.155) ** 2.212 (0.151) ** 2.208 (0.151) ** 2.256 (0.155) **
95-100% 2.816 (0.201) ** 2.396 (0.175) ** 2.338 (0.172) ** 2.333 (0.171) ** 2.389 (0.175) **
>100% 3.532 (0.215) ** 2.819 (0.181) ** 2.732 (0.176) ** 2.720 (0.175) ** 2.807 (0.181) **
Took on additional mortgage debt 1.118 (0.044) ** 1.127 (0.044) ** 1.131 (0.044) ** 1.132 (0.045) ** 1.132 (0.044) **
Has coborrower 0.809 (0.027) ** 0.826 (0.027) ** 0.833 (0.028) ** 0.828 (0.028) ** 0.823 (0.028) **
Home purchase 1.094 (0.066) 1.167 (0.071) * 1.190 (0.073) ** 1.205 (0.074) ** 1.187 (0.072) **
Owner-occupier 1.040 (0.048) 1.062 (0.049) 1.064 (0.049) 1.069 (0.050) 1.070 (0.050)
Full documentation 0.770 (0.063) ** 0.753 (0.061) ** 0.735 (0.059) ** 0.732 (0.060) ** 0.747 (0.061) **
continued
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Non-racial neighborhood characteristics
Median income: <$30,000 1.022 (0.046) 0.963 (0.045) 0.962 (0.045) 1.016 (0.045)
$30,000-$40,000 0.977 (0.036) ** 0.960 (0.035) ** 0.958 (0.035) ** 0.975 (0.035) **
% High school graduates: 70-80% 0.956 (0.035) 0.921 (0.036) * 0.925 (0.036) * 0.943 (0.035)
>80% 0.960 (0.045) 0.925 (0.045) 0.929 (0.045) 0.943 (0.045)
% Non-native born: 20-40% 0.971 (0.042) 0.954 (0.040) 0.953 (0.040) 0.968 (0.041)
40-60% 0.978 (0.044) 0.956 (0.043) 0.957 (0.043) 0.974 (0.043)
>60% 0.865 (0.057) * 0.876 (0.063) 0.884 (0.064) 0.881 (0.059)
Recent foreclosure rate: 1-2% 1.216 (0.047) ** 1.144 (0.045) ** 1.142 (0.045) ** 1.203 (0.047) **
2-3% 1.273 (0.062) ** 1.177 (0.058) ** 1.174 (0.058) ** 1.253 (0.061) **
>3% 1.344 (0.076) ** 1.228 (0.071) ** 1.223 (0.071) ** 1.320 (0.075) **
Recent REO rate: 1-2% 1.096 (0.051) * 1.073 (0.050) 1.079 (0.050) 1.096 (0.051) *
2-3% 1.123 (0.060) * 1.098 (0.060) 1.105 (0.060) 1.125 (0.060) *
>3% 1.153 (0.048) ** 1.122 (0.047) ** 1.129 (0.047) ** 1.159 (0.048) **
Share of non-prime loans: 10-20% 1.142 (0.069) * 1.111 (0.067) 1.118 (0.068) 1.147 (0.069) *
20-30% 1.240 (0.081) ** 1.143 (0.077) * 1.148 (0.077) * 1.229 (0.081) **
>30% 1.152 (0.093) 1.057 (0.088) 1.056 (0.088) 1.137 (0.093)
continued
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Neighborhood racial composition
% Hispanic: 20-40% 1.011 (0.045) 1.018 (0.046)
40-100% 1.080 (0.059) 1.107 (0.063)
% Asian: 20-40% 1.060 (0.058) 1.063 (0.058)
40-100% 1.160 (0.119) 1.182 (0.123)
% Black: 20-40% 1.157 (0.062) **
40-60% 1.308 (0.073) **
60-80% 1.311 (0.077) **
80-100% 1.347 (0.076) **
Borrower race/ethnicity
Black borrower and neighborhood is:
0-20% black 1.267 (0.133) *
20-40% black 1.195 (0.128)
40-60% black 1.270 (0.118) **
60-80% black 1.290 (0.095) **
80-100% black 1.280 (0.083) **
Non-black borrower and neighborhood is:
20-40% black 1.164 (0.075) *
40-60% black 1.333 (0.111) **
60-80% black 1.312 (0.110) **
80-100% black 1.522 (0.117) **
Black borrower 1.043 (0.043)
Hispanic white borrower 0.902 (0.048) 0.902 (0.047) *
Asian borrower 0.963 (0.053) 0.967 (0.053)
Number of loan-months
Number of loans
Log pseudolikelihood
946,922
29,414
-52305.809-52306.504
All models include: a cubic in original loan balance; indicators for prepayment penalty in effect, cash-out refinance, second home, low documentation, property type 
(single & 2-4 family), building age (0-10, 11-50, >50 years & missing); indicators for missing values of FICO, DTI, prepayment penalty; and fixed effects for origination 
year and calendar quarter.  Models 4 and 5 also include indicators for Hispanic black, Hispanic other race, non-Hispanic other race, missing race, female and missing 
gender.
Cox proportional hazard models of 90-day default, hazard ratios reported.  See tables 1 and 2 for notes on explanatory variables and the left-out categories.  
Robust standard errors clustered by census tracts are reported in ( ).  Statistical significance is indicated by: *5% and **1%.
-52282.475-52412.870 -52327.696
Figure 1: Originations in the Analysis Sample by Quarter
Source: LoanPerformance New York City sample, as described in the text.
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Figure 2: Notices of Foreclosure and Percent Black Residents in New York City Census Tracts
Each dot represents a notice of foreclosure (lis pendens ) occurring in 2009.  Source: Public Data Corporation.
Census tracts are shaded based on the percent of black residents in the 2000 US Census.
Figure 3: Census Tract Foreclosure Rates in New York City by Percent Black Residents
Percent of black residents in census tracts is from the 2000 US Census.  The foreclosure rate is the number 
of foreclosure notices issued in a census tract within each 6-month period, divided by the stock of buildings 
in that tract. Source: Public Data Corporation.
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Figure 4: Default Hazards by Month Since Origination and Origination Year
Source: LoanPerformance New York City sample, as described in the text.
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Figure 5: Default Hazards by Month Since Origination, Borrower Race and
Census Tract Percent Black
Source: LoanPerformance New York City sample, as described in the text.  Percent of black residents in 
census tracts is from the 2000 US Census.  “Black borrowers” includes only non-Hispanic blacks.  “Non-
black borrowers” includes all borrowers who reported a race, but did not report being black.  Borrowers 
with missing race information are excluded.
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